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Abstract 
 
International society, so long the resolution to problems of collective political order, now 
appears to be failing in its capacity to deal with transnational challenges such as climate 
change, global security and financial instability. Indeed, the structure of international society 
itself has become a significant obstacle to such pressing issues of global governance. One 
striking response has been the reemergence of cities as important actors on the international 
stage in recent decades. This article will show how these two issues are intrinsically linked. 
Cities have taken on new governance roles in the gaps left by hamstrung nation-states, and 
their contribution to an emerging global governance architecture will be a significant feature 
of the international relations of the twenty-first century. But do the new governance activities 
of cities represent a failure on the part of states, as some scholars have argued? Or are they a 
part of an emerging form of global order, in which the relationship between states, cities and 
other actors is being recalibrated? This article argues that the remarkable renaissance of cities 
in recent decades has been a result of a shift in the structure of international society, and 
assesses the causal drivers of this shift. It goes on to draw out some of the implications of the 
recalibration of the relationship between the city and the state for how we understand the 
emerging form of global order.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The political theorist Benjamin Barber recently made an eye catching call for a global 
‘parliament of mayors’.2 His argument was that the failure of the state (and of the wider 
society of states) to make successful inroads into serious transnational governance issues, 
such as climate change, called forth a pressing need for alternative global governance 
arrangements. At the same time he argued that states have become ever more distant from 
their citizens, who are increasingly alienated by a widening democratic deficit. For Barber it 
is in the renaissance of urban life that solutions to these dual crises of the nation-state can be 
found. He wants to see new scale-jumping municipal democratic bodies emerge, harnessing 
technological advances to join up local participation with novel transnational urban 
assemblies. And, although calls for the establishment of a global parliament of mayors may 
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sound radical, Barber claims that it would be, in effect, merely a formalization of well-
established political trends.  
 
A networked form of city led global governance is not, for Barber, a utopian blueprint, but 
simply the identification and amplification of existing trajectories and concrete practices. The 
capacities for such governance roles already exist in the various global city networks that 
have been constructed. Voluntary and informal co-operation already occur across the many 
city networks that have been built – of which the C40 Climate Leadership Group, Metropolis, 
the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), Mayors for Peace, 
Sister Cities International, United Cities and Local Government (UCLG), or the European 
Forum for Urban Security (EFUS), are but the tip of a huge iceberg. A project is currently 
underway at University College London to map and assess the nature of contemporary city 
networks and their growing diplomatic connections. Initial estimates suggest there may be 
over two hundred such city networks, of various types.3 
 
It is clear, then, that we already inhabit a ‘decentralized planet of networked cities, provinces 
and regions [which] while obviously dominated by traditional nation-states…encompasses a 
wide variety of sub-state and non-state actors, from multi-national corporations and global 
financial institutions to civic NGOs and global social movements’.4 These networks have 
grown in the spaces and gaps left by the states governance failures. However, what is critical 
to note – and this is a point that Barber leaves unmade - is that such transnational urban 
networks are not simply a challenge to the state. This is not a zero-sum game, where the rise 
of cities necessarily means the decline of states. The rise of the city should not be seen as a 
symptom of the exhaustion of the state as a political form, but, rather, a facet of the adaptation 
of the state as it tries to cope with a changing environment. In this sense, it is not the state that 
is failing, but a particular historical iteration of the state – the nation-state – that is being 
reassembled into a new form. It is not international society that is failing, but a historically 
specific form of international society, which is now evolving in an attempt to transcend its 
limitations. And a new historically distinctive form of the city – the Global City – has become 
a critical component of the devolved governance strategy of leading liberal states at the 
contemporary conjuncture. Such cities are, then, a facet of a historically specific form of 
world order.5 
 
This is an emerging order full of contradictions and unresolved dilemmas. The empowerment 
of cities is necessary for them to fulfil their crucial roles in a devolved governance regime. 
Yet, despite having created the conditions in which certain cities have thrived, states still 
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retain an ambivalent relationship with the new global cities that their own policies have 
generated. Nowhere is this ambivalence more apparent than in the run up to UN-HABITAT 
III, taking place in Quito, Ecuador in October 2016. States have commissioned UN-
HABITAT to outline a twenty-year strategy for sustainable, equitable and socially just urban 
development. On the one hand, the central role ascribed to cities in driving such initiatives is 
an acknowledgement by states that cities are the only administrative entities that can put these 
aspirations for sustainable development into practice: this is, after all, a ‘new urban agenda’. 
On the other hand, it is striking that the leadership of cities was not even consulted in the 
preparatory conferences running up to the main event. As the Mayor of Berlin, Michael 
Muller, complains: ‘countries are largely agreeing on preparatory work [for Habitat III] 
without the contribution of cities, even though it is the future of cities that is in question. This 
is absurd’.6 Until Metropolis forced the issue, and gained urban representation at these 
sessions, cities and their leaders were not even part of the formal discussions on the new 
urban future.   
 
States retain a residual reluctance to let go of control. In a sense, they are in denial about the 
emerging form of global order that they have created. And yet, letting go is likely to be the 
only way in which the desired outcomes can be achieved within the governance frameworks 
that states have themselves helped to construct. States seem to realise that they must empower 
cities to take a seat at the top table – the complexity of global governance issues demands 
that. Yet, perhaps states fear where this may lead – the reflexes of centuries of sovereignty are 
hard to retrain. In the longer term, possible serious tensions between cities (growing in 
authority, power and legitimacy) and states (the traditional possessor of these qualities) 
cannot be ruled out. But in the present moment, the rise of the city also reflects a 
transformation in the nature of the state itself, and of the wider international society of which 
each state is a part. The concern of this article is to show just how and why cities have 
become so significant to an emerging form of global order whose very existence signals the 
reality of profound international change.  
 
The problem for International Relations (IR) scholars is that the shape of the historiography 
of the discipline has made it difficult to even see these types of developments, let alone 
theorise them adequately.7 Cities have long been viewed as sub-national political entities, 
internalized within the territorial boundaries of their host state, and therefore located at a 
different level of analysis to those that concern much mainstream IR scholarship. There is a 
very marginal literature on the paradiplomacy of cities, while Chadwick Alger’s work on the 
role of cities in the UN system has been a significant contribution.8 But, in general, cities have 
been deemed relatively unimportant. However, the growing appreciation of very significant 
changes to the urban fabric over the past in few decades - particularly its transnational 
character - is beginning to reverse this neglect.  
 
The immense growth of urban settlements is a core feature of the twenty-first century. The 
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rural world of yesterday has disappeared, as populations have either been drawn from the land 
to seek the opportunities that only city life can offer, or pushed out from traditional 
agricultural occupations by a combination of technological advance and structural adjustment 
programmes. Concentrated into just 2% of the world’s surface, the great urban hubs now hold 
over half of the world’s population, and it is estimated that by 2050 over 66% of the world’s 
population will live in cities.9 UN-HABITAT has documented how the number of cities in the 
world with populations greater than 1 million increased from 75 in 1950 to 447 in 2011.10 In 
the decade between 1990 and 2000 alone there was a 30% increase in the size of urban 
settlements in the developed world and a 50% increase in the developing world. 
As expanding cities merge into each other, they have generated vast conurbations that stretch 
across multiple national territories. Contemporary urban forms are unlike any in the historical 
record - stretching skyward in the immense verticality of the central business district, 
unfurling horizontally, spurred on by new information and transport technologies to 
cannibalise the national space, and often to break through its bounds to form distinctive 
transnational urban regions that tie stretches of global space together in novel ways.11 Such 
cities also exhibit marked polarization, and have generated huge informal settlements and 
slums that are as much a part of the new global city as the relatively tiny, yet globally 
connected, throbbing technological hub of the central business districts. Advances in 
information and communications technologies have given city networks global reach and 
augmented the centrality and power of an exclusive set of nodal points. The construction of 
the global digital infrastructure, in combination with the stitching together of supra-territorial 
urban regions via transport technologies such as high speed rail links and air-traffic routes, 
offers a twenty first-century transnational equivalent of the ways in which networks of canals 
and roads integrated the territorial space of nation-states in earlier centuries. The global city 
network is the material exoskeleton of globalisation, and its nodes the command hubs for the 
governance of many kinds of global flows.12 Indeed, the construction of this planetary urban 
infrastructure represents the emergence of a ‘large technical system’ that in itself may be seen 
to indicate a shift in international order.13 
Such cities are being shaped by exposure to the logics of market forces, tapping into and 
redirecting flows of global capital, drawing their development from streams of financial 
speculation in real estate and infrastructure projects. In this sense the transformation of the 
city fabric has been driven by the far reaching neoliberal restructuring of the global economy 
that began in the 1970s, and the subsequent period of accelerated globalisation. Transformed 
by the project of leading states to build a global market society, cities have been swollen by 
the full force of the unique agglomeration economies that they foster. Over 80% of global 
economic output is generated by contemporary cities. They are the points at which 
productivity, innovation, and wealth converge).14 
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Changes to the material form of cities over the last four decades have been extensively 
studied by scholars working in fields such as Urban Studies and Political Geography. This 
'invisible college'15 of scholars has done much to help us to come to terms with the dynamics 
of urban transformation, developing theoretical frameworks and empirical data. However, this 
literature is strikingly devoid of a broad geo-political and geo-historical perspective, which IR 
scholars should be well placed to provide. As IR scholars have belatedly recognised these 
trends, we have moved in recent years from a situation in which cities were barely discussed 
at all in IR (notable exceptions are to be found in the world-systems literature,16 to a steady 
increase in the number of articles and book length scholarly treatments of the global city 
phenomenon within an IR context.17  
 
IR scholars have been particularly well placed to reveal the lack of political analysis in the 
global cities literature. The early work of scholars in the global city tradition had focussed 
primarily on the economic attributes of such cities. 18  The IR contribution has so far 
considered the role of cities in environmental global governance, the increasing importance of 
city mayors as international actors, the role of cities as regional hubs, the connection of cities 
to the historical development of the international system, and the uneven relative power of 
certain cities and the origins of such power.19 However, my contention would be that there 
has to date (even in scholarship coming from an IR perspective) been an inadequate 
appreciation of why the global city emerged at the point in history that it did, and in the 
distinctive morphological form that it did. Even Sassen is content to link this urban form to 
globalisation, while failing to probe further the underlying form of international society that 
underpins and enables it. Economic functionalism, although clearly part of the story, is an 
inadequate explanation for how the political conditions of possibility for such cities were 
generated. It is also a weak guide to the very profound political implications of the emergence 
of global cities.  
 
What I want to demonstrate in this article is that it is not simply a widening of the field of 
vision that is required here, but an appreciation that the very emergence of the ‘global city’ 
(whether we interpret it as a conceptual device or heuristic, as a material entity, as a political 
actor, as a discourse) tells us something very important about international political order at 
the contemporary conjuncture. Such cities are both an indicator of and a result of a deep shift 
in the nature of international society. The consequences of this must be wide-ranging; for the 
form of political order that international society has provided has underpinned international 
life throughout the modern period. Once we appreciate this, a whole set of questions open up 
that are vital to the more mainstream agenda of scholars of world politics; questions of state 
transformation, the nature of global governance architecture, international security and the 
character of international political order. IR scholars should be taking note of these urban 
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developments, and asking: what are the political conditions of possibility that allow for such a 
fragile network of global cities to emerge, and to endure, in a world where security has been 
the preserve of the state, and cities have long ago lost their pre-modern defensive capabilities? 
What does the emergence of the global city tell us about the changing nature of the state, and 
of state sovereignty, territoriality and bordering practices in the early twenty-first century? 
What forms of identity emerge within the political spaces of global cities, and how far might 
they challenge a modern subjectivity and sense of citizenship constructed around the nation? 
What does the rescaling of the city - and the state - tell us about the ongoing tensions between 
an international system built upon the foundation of territorial sovereignty, and a 
fundamentally transnational capitalist economic system? These are issues that will feature in 
the following discussion. There is a vast and under-explored research programme here, and 
one function of this article is to try to make visible its outlines.  
 
The article proceeds in three sections. Each section delves progressively deeper into the issues 
indicated by the shift in urban morphology and city practices. The first section looks at the 
role that cities have been playing in an emerging, decentered, global governance architecture. 
The second seeks to explain how and why this architecture developed, and why cities are a 
critical component of it. The third section then seeks to unravel some of the political 
implications of these developments. It argues that the evolution of international political 
order, towards a nascent form of global order, augers a period of transition for states, cities 
and international society alike, and examines some of the consequences of this transition at 
the contemporary conjuncture. In particular, this final section of the article warns that, even 
though an urban renaissance may be necessary to deal with problems of a transnational scope, 
it represents a disruption to core ordering principles such as sovereignty and territoriality. It 
therefore brings in its wake the risk of reopening many of the problems of political order that 
the modern international system emerged to resolve. In this sense, cities are likely to be 
central spaces in which systemic contradictions and distortions will be played out in the 
twenty-first century, and in which novel forms of political, social and economic practices will 
emerge. 
 
 
Decentering Governance: Towards Global Order 
 
As Barber’s recent intervention makes clear, cities take their place in an emerging global 
governance regime that has unfurled gradually over recent decades. The global governance 
features of global cities may be seen as a facet of an emerging global order, imperfectly 
worked out and feeling its way into the twenty-first century. Such an emerging global order 
may be seen as a historically specific iteration of international political order, and rests upon 
the bedrock of the international society of states, which provides it with its conditions of 
possibility.  
 
The concept of international order lies at the core of international theory. Differing 
interpretations of the character of this order continue to divide the discipline. There is a 
tension between those that view international political order as a set of stable and regular 
patterns of behaviour (for example, the school of structural realism, which concerns itself 
primarily with recurrent patterns of power balancing between states across the span of 
history), and those that view order in a more normative and less mechanical sense, stressing 
the evolution of norms, rules and values. Hedley Bull  argued that the common rules and 
institutions developed by states over time constituted not just a system of interaction, but an 
international society.20 It is this understanding of international order that allows insight into 
how states might collectively develop new norms that can fundamentally alter the 
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environment in which they operate.21 I want to show here how the historical evolution of the 
dominant norms in international society, specifically the centrality of liberal ideas, backed by 
a particular configuration of material power, has begun to reshape international society in 
interesting ways, changing the nature of the state itself, as well as its relation to other entities 
and actors, including cities previously internalised within the national polity.  
 
In this sense, the emergence of both global cities and global governance is a result of the 
distinctive path taken by the international society of states in the latter part of the twentieth-
century. For much of the modern period the values or goals of international society aimed at 
little more than coexistence; the norms of political sovereignty and non-intervention, for 
example, were directed towards the guarantee of political independence for states, and the 
regulation of the conduct of conflict and warfare between them. The key value of this form of 
political order was the survival of international society itself. 
 
Although this type of minimal – or pluralist - international society seemed especially valuable 
in the Cold War context in which Bull wrote, the character of political order has undergone an 
important shift since the mid-twentieth-century. The narrow focus of a pluralist international 
society on issues such as war, peace and diplomacy has begun to give way to a more 
extensive complex interdependence aimed at regulating an increasingly complex global 
economy, and dealing with transnational issues such as climate change, or the management of 
volatile global markets, or the emergence of transnational forms of criminal activity and 
security threats.  
 
The issue of how a traditional sovereignty based order might come to regulate the 
transnational forces and transnational spaces that are a feature of the current conjuncture 
becomes a key problem of our time. This mismatch between the transnational scale of such 
problems and the resources of international society to deal with them seems to indicate a 
functional requirement for such problems to be devolved to other actors who do have the 
scope to make an impact. It is here that new practices of global governance are emerging – 
and it is this requirement that scale-jumping cities are well placed to fill. In this sense, global 
cities may be seen as part of an emerging global order generated by a shift in the normative 
structure of international society. 
 
Cities are thus able to take their place among a range of other actors in a nascent global 
governance architecture. Such a global order has been constructed on the foundations of an 
increasingly solidarist liberal international society. But it is also clear to English School 
thinkers that the nascent global order contains many points of tension and contradiction with 
that earlier pluralist form of international order. 22  This has, of course, long been the 
contention of globalisation theorists, particularly the more sophisticated ‘transformationalist’ 
variant.23 But this question of order transition needs a more sophisticated and nuanced 
interpretation than much of the globalisation literature offers. Rather than a simple transition 
from the national to the global scale, we seem to be seeing the emergence of complex multi-
nodal and multi-scalar forms of governance, where the emerging links between different 
actors are ‘crystallising into transnational webs of power’, and states are increasingly 
becoming enmeshed in these webs (Cerny 2010, 4).24 
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Global governance, then, offers a compromise; a mid-point on the spectrum of order, 
somewhere between the pluralist anarchical international society and   world government. It 
involves the empowerment of many actors above and below the state, including the 
individuals, social movements, NGOs and institutions that comprise civil society. It involves 
a fusion or recalibration of public and private actors, coming together in hybrid functional 
networks to find solutions to problems of collective action where states have been wanting. 
These are forms of interaction that are horizontal, non-hierarchical, and embrace the bottom-
up dynamics of self-organisation. The normative proposition is that they bypass vertical, 
hierarchical and centralised (statist) structures where power has so often ossified in the 
history of the twenty-first century. This derives from a set of liberal philosophical principles, 
particularly those of market exchange and mutuality. It lays emphasis upon an expansion of 
private authority in complex governance and the provision of public goods – whether this 
manifests itself in private legal systems such as commercial arbitration, or the use of technical 
knowledge, such as in the work of credit ratings agencies.25 This emerging system is no 
longer effectively captured by either the anarchical or hierarchical categories of international 
structure, but represents instead a form of heterarchy – a system in which political authority 
and governance are shared among a variety of actors.26 
 
In delegating state authority to a range of other actors, via its fusion of public and private 
governance, this form of global order is inherently decentralising. The importance of 
contemporary cities to this global governance system lies not just in their proximity to the 
local, nor in their transnational reach, but also in the way that they have developed 
capabilities to tie these scales together to generate the capacity for novel forms of governance. 
The growing network of 83 major cities represented by the C40 Climate Leadership Group 
offers a greater scalar reach than any state can achieve. There is a growing literature on global 
governance in IR that stresses the hybrid nature of transnational governance.27 Many of the 
same drivers that have allowed actors such as international NGOs to take up an important role 
in such arrangements are also applicable to the rise of cities. In this sense, the global city is 
revealed as part of an emergent hybrid global order, in which the primacy of the state appears 
to have been either eroded or abdicated, and new practices are developing. As cities have 
increasingly become a core feature of this governance regime, they have made forays into 
influencing global governance outcomes, and they have begun to exhibit capacities that might 
lead us to think that, as Barber clearly does, they will play an ever greater role in future 
governance arrangements. Today, we see the emerging governance capacities of cities in 
multiple spheres. Novel developments in scale-jumping city governance can be seen across 
the political, security and economic domains.  
 
In the political domain one notable feature of changing urban governance, and one that 
contains significant implications for the future of global governance, is the rise to prominence 
of the city mayor.28 Charismatic global city mayors such as Michael Bloomberg in New York, 
or Boris Johnston in London, have enjoyed a rising profile in recent years. But beyond their 
media presence, the very phenomena of the city mayor, as well as the increasing devolution 
of governance functions and powers to cities, reveals a trend towards a reinvigoration of 
urban politics and a recalibration of state authority. British Chancellor George Osborne’s 
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shortly to be introduced Cities Devolution Bill - in which ‘Northern Powerhouse’ English city 
regions will gain greater control over health, social care, policing, planning and municipal tax 
revenues - is but one manifestation of this broader decentralizing trend .29  
 
These trends are not restricted to powerful Western cities. Barber highlights the impact of 
Delhi Mayor Sheila Dikshit, whose innovative programme of town hall meetings and 
participatory budgeting has successfully involved citizens directly in the governance of their 
city.30 This is part of a notable global trend in recent decades that has seen many experiments 
in participatory budgeting, with citizens playing a role in the allocation of a portion of the city 
budget.31 In fact the participatory budgeting experiment that began in the 1980s in Latin 
America has spread around the world, including to cities in North America and Europe. There 
are now over three thousand cities that have experimented with some form of participatory 
budgeting. And, although such practices have operated at a very small scale, representing a 
tiny proportion of the overall city budget, nevertheless they instantiate a model of good 
governance practice, and offer a pathway to greater civic participation. 
 
Mayors have also played key roles in pushing cities and local governments to develop 
capabilities as networked actors that allow them to have the global reach that they need to 
bridge the various scales at which the global issues that effect them operate. The new 
technical capacities offered by digital networks have meant that it is increasingly possible for 
mayors to straddle the local and the global scales. Mayors for Peace, with over 5000 city 
members in 153 states, comprises a cooperative network of cities that strive to place the 
abolition of nuclear weapons on the international agenda, as well as issues surrounding 
poverty and refugees, local conflicts and environmental change. Metropolis, or The World 
Association of Major Metropolises, has been around since 1985 and has over 100 members, 
offering a forum for sharing knowledge and best practices that promote urban sustainability. 
The World Organisation of United Cities and Local Governments represents a recent attempt 
to boost the political representation of local government in the international arena, in 
particular with the United Nation’s agencies that deal with urban issues, such as UNESCO, 
UN-HABITAT and the World Bank. 
 
Perhaps the most fully developed network is the C40 Climate Leadership Group, whose  city 
members engage in strategic partnerships with private actors such as the Clinton Foundation’s 
Climate Change Initiative and multi-national engineering corporations such as Arup. The C40 
group seeks to lead efforts to tackle climate change, recognising that cities already have the 
potential resources to contribute to positive governance outcomes on the global stage. These 
efforts take the shape of collective action, joint-coordination and common strategy, including 
sharing and diffusing best practice models and technical know-how in areas such as 
transportation, energy and waste infrastructures, and retrofitting projects. These various 
initiatives engage with national and international forums, but also develop a parallel global 
governance architecture that bypasses traditional hierarchical channels and state diplomacy 
bottlenecks. There have been some clear and measurable successes, including a claimed 
10,000 city climate actions among members since 2009, and a collective commitment to 3Gt 
of CO2 reductions by 2030.32 However, there is a big caveat: the C40 network’s goals and 
activities remain well within the discursive space of neoliberal discourse, framing solutions in 
the language and philosophy of markets, offering technocratic agendas, partnering with 
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private foundations and multi-national corporations. The C40 is a prime example of the 
liberal inflection of the emerging global governance regime. 
 
Some cities have also been generating new forms of security governance. Cities are on the 
front line of many new security threats, as the transnational networks of value that they house 
have become potential targets and points of structural vulnerability. We might find the 
leading edge of this trend in New York City, where, in the post- September 11th 2001 era, the 
municipal administration has responded to the perceived inability of the state to protect it by 
developing its own institutional capacities for counter-terrorism. Scholars have noted a 
gradual militarisation of the New York Police Department, as well as its participation in 
sophisticated transnational intelligence gathering networks in partnership with other 
municipal authorities around the world.33  
 
And global cities have long been at the core of economic governance - finding their initial 
raison d’etre as command and control nodes in the construction of a global scale market 
economy.  Under globalisation, a seemingly paradoxical trend of the new economy was 
making itself clearer during the 1990s: the increasing spatial dispersion of economic activity 
around the world, as manufacturing relocated to areas of low cost labour, while, at the same 
time, the global economy became ever-more integrated. Saskia Sassen’s seminal theory of the 
global city provided an explanation for this double movement of dispersal and integration: 
that the advent of the new international division of labour, the rise of the new organisational 
form of the multi-national corporation, and the emergence of digital networks and new 
working practices, have created a need for a new form of strategic command and control in 
the global economy. The technologically enabled decentralisation of the economy undercuts 
the traditional controlling and organising function of the state in economic life. At the same 
time it opens up both a space and a need for new forms of global economic governance. This 
strategic function has been fulfilled first and foremost by global cities, and the incredible 
concentration of knowledge, wealth and power that crystalise at their cores. 
 
Although the early global cities literature focussed upon their economic functions, Sassen has 
also begun to draw out some of the important social implications of the distinctive political 
economy of the global city form. These include the forms of polarisation and 
inclusion/exclusion in global cities that the intervening years have only made increasingly 
obvious. Sassen also relates how new modes of private governance and new forms of private 
authority have grown up to facilitate the functioning of these global networks, as states have 
sought to denationalise and marketise formerly public forms of authority.34 This hybrid form 
of public/private governance, as we have seen, is at the core of contemporary global 
governance strategies. 
 
A unifying factor in governance projects across the political, security and economic domains 
is that cities and their populations are key players in globalisation. Global cities have 
generated astonishing levels of growth and economic power, an unprecedented concentration 
of people and wealth, and have the most advanced technological infrastructures available on 
the planet. They have scale that stretches across traditional state boundaries, and vast 
populations that place the traditional understanding of what international politics is into 
question. Although they may generate many of the most pressing political problems of the 
day (generating most greenhouse gas emissions, for example), cities represent an immense 
creative resource to generate solutions to such problems. It is widely recognised now that new 
ways of urban living must be at the heart of any sustainable solution to climate change. Cities 
are beginning to act as important ‘norm-entrepreneurs’ in setting global agendas. A global 
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network of thousands of linked cities affords a vast reservoir of human capital and creativity 
that will develop in unexpected directions. 
  
However, there are clear limits to these early forays into global governance – and these limits 
speak directly to the question of whether global cities emerge from the failure and impeding 
irrelevance of states or from their evolution and adaptation. The new autonomy and 
capabilities of cities do not replace or challenge the agency of states: they are both enabled by 
and constrained by the power of states and the state-system. Global Cities rehouse existing 
capabilities and capacities built up in the era of the national-state. In this sense, the 
empowerment of cities is a product of state rescaling strategies.35 Global cities have not 
emerged from a vacuum – the underlying structure of international society that gave rise to 
them continues to shape their development and their possibilities.  
 
 
Geopolitical Roots of the Global City 
 
We must now push beyond simply noting such developments in global governance to analyse 
their causal drivers. Only by identifying the specific characteristics of the iteration of 
international society behind the devolution, decentralisation and augmentation of governance 
capacities and capabilities are we able to fully understand the implications of global cities for 
global politics. As I have outlined, these developments in global governance describe a 
contemporary shift from an international political order rooted in the society of states, to a 
more diffuse form of global order, which relies upon the interaction of a variety of non-state 
actors operating at different scales. It is this nascent form of global order that provides global 
cities with their conditions of possibility, allowing them to become key nodal points in global 
networks, key sites of systemic contention and contradiction, and actors within the politics of 
global governance. My central thesis is that global cities have become an integral element of 
the project of leading states to create, and to secure, a form of decentralised, self-organising 
market society. This section identifies some of the complex interacting causal drivers of this 
shift. By assessing the origins of these developments we can gain greater insight into their 
political implications.  
 
The explanation for the transformation of both urban form and international order may be 
found in the confluence of a number of factors in the mid to late-twentieth century. These 
include: the rise of the United States to a hegemonic position; its central role in uniting the 
liberal capitalist world during the Cold War; its defeat of the Soviet Union and subsequent 
position of unipolarity. This geopolitical configuration of the international system then 
interacted with the separate dynamics of crisis induced restructuring of the capitalist world 
economy in the 1970s, and the rejection of Keynesian embedded liberalism in favour of a 
monetarist and neoliberal political and economic philosophy. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union, together with the rejection of Keynesian state management, points us towards another 
important dimension of this conjuncture: the ideological embrace of decentralisation, long 
advocated by neoliberal thinkers, as a response to the general crisis of statist forms of social 
organisation. Additionally, we must also consider the shift in the normative basis of 
international society outlined earlier: to one of increasingly complex interdependence and 
cooperation via a deepening of international regimes and institutions aimed at regulating 
common problems. There has been a quantum leap in the complexity of the technical 
transnational issues to which international society needs to respond: The response of states 
has been to embrace the (decidedly questionable) power of the market to solve issues of 
collective action. Finally, the developmental trajectory of digital information and 
communications technologies has interacted with these other dimensions in complex ways to 
empower actors, releasing them from traditional hierarchies, connecting them together in 
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transnational networks, allowing them to process ever-greater quantities of information. In the 
following paragraphs I discuss each of these interconnected drivers in turn. 
 
US Hegemony 
 
It often missed by global city scholars that the type of liberal inflected transnationalism that 
global cities embody only fully flourished in the American unipolar moment following 
victory in the Cold War. This period of accelerated global city formation, analysed so 
effectively by Sassen, must have a power political foundation. It has been the hegemonic 
power of the United States, and its ability to underwrite and extend the principles of global 
liberalism, that provided the necessary historical conditions of possibility for global cities to 
emerge as actors. Global cities operate within the organisational space created by US 
unipolarity. It is no accident that the other two global cities accompanying New York in 
Sassen’s triumvirate are London and Tokyo, embedded within key allied states.  
 
It is, then, no coincidence that such values begin to reshape both urban morphology and the 
normative structure of international society in the period of US unipolarity. It should be 
marked that the embrace of decentralised forms of global governance does not mean that 
forms of hierarchy have ceased to exist. 36  As Hurrell argues, American geopolitical 
dominance is 'the essential power political pivot of the expansion of global liberalism’, 
adding that ‘whatever view one takes as to the extant character of this US global order, it is 
evidently the case that the development of liberal solidarism in the 1990s built on this 
inherited institutional core’.37 It remains unclear how far we can distinguish, in the features of 
contemporary political order, between an anarchical international society characterised by 
increasingly shared values of global liberalism, and the hierarchical reality of the 
preponderance of US power. John Ikenberry has effectively shown how the US co-opted 
other powers into a loosely rule-based liberal hegemonic system, in which it provided 
international public goods and enforced global security.38 Connecting the rise of global cities 
to the extension of liberal order requires also that we connect their rise to the distribution of 
power that has allowed the US ‘liberal leviathan’ to shape the international environment in 
ways that reflect its core political philosophies. 
 
The ability of US power to continue to underpin this form of political order remains one of 
the most important open questions of twenty-first century international politics, and it will 
also be crucial to the continued existence of the global city form. The liberal ascendency has 
been with us since the end of World War Two, and has accelerated since the fall of the Soviet 
Union. It will not be derailed easily - too many players have an important stake in its survival, 
and no attractive alternative system has presented itself. Previously the route to overthrowing 
a particular international order lay in great power hegemonic war. With the stabilising 
influence of nuclear weapons and the seemingly unbridgeable gap between US military power 
and the rest, this no longer seems to be a likely path for the future of international order. The 
probability is that an international order with liberal market characteristics will endure in 
some form or another, even in the light of US relative decline, and in the teeth of the rising 
power of illiberal heavyweights such as China and Russia. This system is now firmly enough 
established for some to suggest that it could out-last US hegemony.39 This is important, 
because the possibility for open, global cities will remain symbiotic with some kind of liberal 
international order.  
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The Crises of Statism 
 
In addition to linking the rise of the global city to US-led liberal order, it should also be 
viewed as part of the response to a succession of crises of statist (that form of political life in 
which states have substantial centralised control over political and economic activities) forms 
of international political economy over the past two centuries. The emergence of global cities 
may be read as a strategic response to the tensions that have emerged from the two conflicting 
master logics of modern life: the ‘incongruent spaces’ of a political structure built upon 
sovereign territoriality and the fundamentally transnational capitalist economic structure that 
grew up within it.40 Earlier responses to the difficulties that statist modes had with negotiating 
the mismatch between economic and political structures played a central role in the major 
political and social upheavals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as different variants 
of the state emerged and transformed in a series that included imperialist, socialist, national 
socialist and social democratic welfare states.41 In each case states were responding to the 
limitations of statist politics by unleashing forces of transformation that reshaped the state 
itself. The crisis of the western social democratic national state, as well as the eventual 
collapse of the Soviet Union, should be set in a long series of crises of statism. The global city 
emerges as part of the latest attempt to mediate this scalar gap. 
 
The victory of a specific ‘neoliberal’ political philosophy within the US political system over 
the course of the last four decades has formed the bedrock for a transformation of both states 
and markets. Between 1945-70, to use Karl Polanyi’s terminology, market capitalism was 
embedded within a set of institutions that tamed the social dislocations that it inevitably 
brought in its wake. The Bretton Woods system set a firm framework of rules and institutions 
for international commercial and financial transactions, underpinned by US hegemony and 
the dollar. However, in 1971, President Nixon, responding to a combination of factors (the 
cost of the Cold War, particularly the expense of the war in Vietnam, the ‘oil shocks’ 
resulting from crisis in the Middle East, and the inexorable rise in wages, saturation of 
domestic markets, and crisis of capitalist profitability), broke the convertibility of the dollar 
into gold. In the reconstituted system, the ideas and principles of neoliberalism, which had 
remained out of favour for decades, were adopted. Its central principles were a commitment 
to free markets, minimal state involvement in economic affairs, free movement of capital, and 
the extension of the competitive dynamics of the market to most aspects of social life. The 
dollar to gold peg was replaced by a system of floating exchange rates, and the dollar now 
became a reserve currency. In place of the tightly regulated capital controls of the post-war 
period came the evolution of the global financial markets, as capital was freed to move 
internationally to seek the best returns. This in turn led to the great rise of the transnational 
corporation, and the growth of foreign direct investment, as firms sought new opportunities 
beyond their saturated domestic markets. The result was a new spatial order, an integrated 
global economy, in which cities would be freed to take on a pivotal role. The allocation of 
capital and the mobility and speed with which finance flowed around the globe was greatly 
augmented by the emergence of the new information technologies, and the advent of 
computerised trading exchanges and stock markets in the 1980s.  
 
The project to create a global market society, in which the state would be reduced and 
transformed into a form of market state, and in which an embrace of decentralisation would 
call forth the functional requirement of the global city, has hollowed out the social democratic 
Keynesian welfare state, most likely irreparably. The resultant market state is underpinned by 
a very different rationale to the fading nation-state it is replacing: its function is no longer to 
                                                
40 Hannes Lacher, Beyond Globalization : Capitalism, Territoriality and the International 
Relations of Modernity (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006); Brenner, New State Spaces 
41 Henri Lefebvre, Neil Brenner, and Stuart Elden, State, Space, World : Selected Essays 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009). 
14 
maximise the welfare of its citizens, but their opportunities. Rather than utilising resources 
directly, this form of state redistributes resources into private hands. It stresses meritocracy as 
a justification for hierarchical and unequal social relations. The conception of human self-
hood here is competitive and individualistic. This is the risk society of reflexive late-
modernity described by Ulrich Beck,,where the older strategies that nation-states used to 
protect their citizens from the economic and political hazards beyond its borders is at an 
end.42 Furthermore, the privatisation of key national assets and infrastructures has fractured 
the integrated homogenous space that had been a result of over two centuries of nation 
building. Philip Bobbitt suggests that the change in the constitutional basis of the state 
represented by the market state also brings forth warped forms in its own image: just as the 
market state takes on a networked, decentralised and outsourced form, so too do social 
movements, and criminal and terrorist networks. 43  The resultant extended transnational 
infrastructures and networks of valued flows draw out new forms of state strategy; as we shall 
go on to see. 
 
The political response by leading states to the linked crises of statism and embedded 
liberalism has, then, involved a recalibration of the relationship between state, market and 
civil society, creating a form of order that, building on Polanyi, we might call a global market 
society.44 As we have seen, within global governance architectures market exchange is 
increasingly seen as the solution to problems of collective action. That the market has come to 
occupy such a pre-eminent position in the institutions of international society may be viewed 
as the internationalisation of a US inflected culture of political economy. As Panitch and 
Gindin have made clear, the US state was absolutely essential to the making of global 
capitalism. Against what they consider to be a tendency to posit a false dichotomy between 
states and markets, they argue that the US state has been central to planning and 
implementing the emergence of global capitalism in the twentieth century; expanding a vision 
of market civilization to the global scale, and defending those components needed for it to 
function - property rights, currency stability, periodic crisis containment - as well as 
defending it from geopolitical challenges, as in the Cold War struggle against the Soviet 
Union. Indeed, the US has also played a key role in restructuring other states to conform to 
the state forms required for a globalised capitalism: whether this be in the post World War 
reconstruction of its former enemies, Germany and Japan, or through the structural power of 
international institutions that have demanded 'structural adjustments' to the domestic political 
economies of states seeking entry into the global economy.45  
 
Technological Change 
 
This specific culture of political economy has also found its expression in the shape of 
technological developments that underpin new global practices. As Castells and others have 
argued, technology develops within a particular social structure, is imbued with particular 
social values and aims, and evolves in response to signals given by particular economic 
frameworks.46 Technology embodies society, and society shapes technological development: 
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‘technology is society made durable’.47 This insight is crucial when we come to consider how 
cultural and social norms and forms of political order have shaped the material infrastructure 
for the new transnational socio-technical networks formed by global cities. Such transnational 
networks rest upon a culture that embraces decentralisation, self-organising complexity, and 
multi-nodal pluralism. Castells has further drawn the link between these technological forms 
and the liberal values emerging in the context of dominance of US politics and culture. 
 
It is, then, the profound developments in digital information and communications 
technologies in the last quarter of the twentieth century that give the global city characteristics 
that are different from earlier cities. Global cities house the key material and social 
components of a transnational system of financial innovation and exchange. This 
infrastructure is selectively sited, maintained and upgraded within particular global cities. The 
emergence of networked forms of digital information and communications technologies are, 
as David Harvey has argued, inseparable from the success of the neoliberal project, where the 
decentralized ‘global market place’ is only made visible by the ability of technology to 
record, store and analyse.48 The development of these technological infrastructures has begun 
to alter the relative balance between territory, scale, place and networks.49 The splintering and 
commodification of national space inherent in the ideals and practices of neoliberalism – in 
particular, privatisation - has created a set of new spatial forms that jump scales and tie 
various fragments of global space together in novel ways. The network becomes a key 
organisational form..What global city networks represent is nothing less than the material 
infrastructure for sustaining a global market society.  
 
The most advanced forms of information and communications technology infrastructures are, 
then, part of the fabric of the global city, and there is clear potential to use this technology to 
generate efficient solutions to a variety of problems. Promising developments coalesce around 
the marrying of new technologies with urban management. There is a growing emphasis on 
Smart Cities - the application of a combination of information communications technologies 
and 'big data' to urban management. These technologies promise an enhanced understanding 
of the patterns of urban life drawn by vast populations. Such developments augur a future in 
which greater control can be exercised over urban processes. Because the technologies 
involved draw upon logics of decentralisation, dispersal and bottom-up dynamics, they point 
away from the older model of statist top-down hierarchical control. In this sense, they fit 
nicely with the forms of networked authority that cities have always embodied, and highlight 
the increasingly problematic nature of state sovereignty.50 
 
The complexity of transnational challenges at the global scale requires this processing power. 
The demands of technical knowledge within this complex system are increasingly beyond the 
competence of any one state, or collection of states. Hybridity in global governance provides 
the functionality to tackle this complexity. The specialized technical knowledge developed by 
private actors has made their incorporation into the task of producing global public goods 
essential. In this sense the emergence of global governance may be viewed as a functional 
adaptation to the complexity of transnational political life.51 It is, however, important not to 
take this functionalist logic too far. For, as we have seen, there is a large degree of historical 
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contingency in the emergence of hybrid global governance. The global city is ultimately a 
contingent phenomenon; a product of the historical confluence of power, ideas, social 
practices and technologies; driven by the limits of previous models of political economy, and 
also by weaknesses in the structure of international society, as it seeks to adapt to a world of 
complex interdependence.   
 
 
 
 
Cities in a Global Order: Reopening Pandora’s Box? 
 
Having argued that global cities emerge in response to multiple interlacing historical drivers 
that have generated a historically specific form of global order, the final section of this article 
will consider some of the implications of these developments for contemporary global 
politics. I want to highlight three interlinked consequences of this form of global order. 
Because state form and city form are linked, in parallel with the emergence of global cities 
new forms of market state have developed that point towards a shift in the nature of modern 
sovereignty. New security practices are visible that bring into question traditional 
assumptions about territoriality and bordering. And, as a result, the logics of the wider 
modern international order have been fractured, with potentially destabilizing results. 
 
At its heart the emergence of the global city, and the open question of how it fits into 
contemporary global order, is but one symptom of a crisis in the ordering principles of 
international political life. Pushing beyond the pluralist form of international order, towards a 
form of liberal global order, has begun to produce a deformation in traditional understandings 
of territory and sovereignty. The compact between the market state and the global city may 
have offered a decentralising solution to the crises of statism, but it also raises a variety of 
questions about the potentially emergent and unexpected logics that may arise as a result. The 
creation of such new spatial forms as global cities and their networks is a symptom of ‘the 
increasingly puzzling character of the problem of sovereignty’.52 As the market state moves to 
unravel the previous spatial mode, privatising, parcelling and commodifying its formerly 
homogenous national space - the most valued fragments of which are reconnected at the 
transnational scale in novel formations - new fractures and fault-lines appear within the 
structures of modern international order. As the state works to pursue strategies that reshape 
its territory, it places great stress on those supports that have given it its modern form. The 
emergence of the novel governance assemblage of which global cities are a key component 
brings into doubt the continued viability and integrity of the modern spatial settlement, and 
suggests an uncertain future in which this settlement must now be systematically renegotiated 
at every scale.  
 
The modern concept of sovereignty has typically produced sharply demarcated boundaries - 
clear insides and outsides - that now appear to be weakening. But modern sovereignty is not 
just a historically particular production of space. As Rob Walker has tried to show throughout 
his work, the 'international' is a complex philosophical edifice that, having emerged as a 
solution to the crises that wracked seventeenth-century Europe, operates as a historically 
specific response to the problem of generating stable political order.53 This has been a 
remarkably powerful system, and any unravelling of that solution (to which the developments 
charted here do indeed point) is likely to reopen a host of political and philosophical 
questions which will need to be solved in new ways. Walker thus seeks to resist the notion 
that we can move in any simple linear sense from a politics of the international to a politics of 
the globe, or of some world beyond the international: any such shift will unleash the forces 
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that the modern international system evolved to tame. Rather than offering a way out of the 
problems generated by the system of territorial states, the moves towards global order that we 
have charted here risk opening a Pandora's box of virulent political riddles. Such a 
deformation of traditional conceptions of sovereignty and territory threatens to reawaken the 
political issues that the modern political settlement had worked to tame within state territorial 
boundaries. The opening of the territorial container that the scale-hopping global city 
represents threatens to once again unleash the powerful forces that it was built to contain.  
 
For example, the rescaled market state has a very different raison d’être to the nation-state it 
has replaced: its objects of sovereign decision now extend beyond the traditional homeland 
territory. This shift is exemplified by an evolution in security discourses and practices. The 
security practices of leading states exhibit a notable shift in focus in recent decades: from 
securing the traditional territorial border to new practices aimed at securing the new flows of 
value, which run primarily through the world’s urban networks. Stephen Graham has shown 
how US defence planners have been developing a strategy of 'forward defence', which 
involves pushing the concept of the border outwards to tackle threats before they reach the 
US mainland - as in the Container Security Initiative that seeks to secure the global network 
of seaports.54 But, at the same time, the valued spaces of global flows on which the US 
depends (electronic finance, Internet communications, trade and transport) must also be 
protected. The US Department of Homeland Security now talks of creating a 'global security 
envelope'. There have been attempts to 'reengineer global finance, communication, airline and 
port systems to achieve a kind of ubiquitous border, a 'global homeland' which follows the 
infrastructural architectures of a global network of cities and economic enclaves rather than 
the territorial limits demarcating nation-states'.55 Some have argued that these tensions may 
signal the eventual replacement of the national security apparatus with a decentralised 
transnational security system combining public authority, private actors and individuals: yet 
another governance hybrid.56 One way to characterise such a system in formation is as a 
transnational security assemblage - as Abrahamson and Williams do in their study of the 
complex transnational security formation emerging in Africa of state governments and 
militaries, private security firms and individuals.57 
 
Part of the explanation for this shift lies in the emergence of the market state and the political 
philosophy that underpins it. Nation-states are no longer able to shield their citizens 
effectively from global economic flows, just as they are increasingly unable to guarantee the 
security of the national citizen in the face of transnational risks such as climate change, 
pandemics and international terrorism, or even to guarantee the national border in a world of 
nuclear weapons. The very raison d'etre of the nation-state rested upon such guarantees: 
securing the national border, enforcing civil peace through the rule of law, guaranteeing 
economic stability, welfare and employment.58 No longer able to fulfil its constitutional 
promise of securing the welfare and security of its citizens, this pillar of legitimacy has been 
removed (exemplified by the neoliberal roll back of welfare commitments and nationally 
integrated infrastructures, for example) to be replaced by a very different promise: that of 
securing access and opportunity in a global market society.  
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The post-Cold War privatisation of warfare contributes to this instability. As a result of the 
liberal marketisation of the weapons industry, unprecedented quantities of weapons and 
sources of finance flow around the system.59 Security threats are, as a result, much more 
diffuse and decentred. Here, again, the rise to prominence of the global city is a key part of 
this shift in the security landscape. Cities have become the primary locus of contemporary 
violence, whether it be the Islamist inspired terrorist attacks on cities such as New York, 
London, Paris, Madrid or Mumbai, or the urbanicide of the 'war on terror' in the cities of 
Iraq.60 Just as cities become the key nodal sites and critical infrastructure of a globalised 
political economy, so too do they offer the most tempting targets. 
 
Indeed, the development in recent decades of what Graham has called the 'new military 
urbanism' (a trend that it is worth noting was in evidence since before September 11th, 2001, 
but greatly exacerbated by those events) highlights how the city has become central to the 
changing architecture of international security. Novel security practices in evidence in 
contemporary urban spaces are a reflection of the wider structural shift in the nature of 
international society. Traditional security lenses are an inadequate guide to the ways in which 
cities and urbanisation are at the heart of novel and unfolding territorial forms of control, 
inequality and insecurity. As we saw earlier in the discussion of the security dimension of 
global city governance, urban life is increasingly subject to a creeping militarisation, and a 
blurring of the traditional lines between civilian policing and military force.  
 
The emergence of novel configurations of transnational space has made it far more difficult to 
'draw the line' between the inside and the outside of the state, and to maintain the distinction 
between traditional military operations and domestic policing. As transnational flows and 
circuits (commodity chains, logistics networks, urban transnational infrastructures) have 
become the lifeblood of powerful market states, so these states must develop new strategies to 
secure them. As global cities are the crucial command and control nodes for the deployment 
and switching of global capital throughout the developed and developing worlds, securing 
such transnational urban spaces becomes crucial to such a strategy. Global city networks are 
thus implicated in the operations of a system of transnational neoliberal capitalism; they form 
its material conduits and exoskeleton, and are increasingly the medium through which such a 
system is secured. The complex challenge for such a form of political order has become how 
to achieve such security, whilst also allowing for the embrace of the hyper-mobility that 
characterises the neoliberal global political economy. The answer alighted upon thus far 
seems to be a market liberalism underpinned by increasing authoritarianism and militarism, 
directed both at securing valued spaces abroad and at targeting problematic citizens at home. 
This is a development that would not have surprised Karl Polanyi, who saw how the 
nineteenth-century attempt to generate a market society brought its own authoritarian 
impulses. As the polarisation of wealth generated by market society finds its purest spatial 
expression in global city morphology, cities become the focus of social control. There is a 
notable convergence between techniques and practices of policing, intelligence gathering and 
military tactics: 
 
 ‘states are becoming internationally organised systems geared towards trying to separate 
people and circulations deemed risky or malign from those deemed risk-free or worthy of 
protection…resulting in a blurring between international borders and urban/local borders. Indeed, the 
two increasingly seem to meld, to constitute a 'multiplicity of control points' that become distributed 
along key lines of circulation and key geographies of wealth and power...’61 
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The political geographer John Agnew has urged us to see such developments as a form of 
territoriality: the politically strategic use of territory ‘by way of defining market spaces 
geographically, organising military commands, and inventing new forms of supra-national 
authority'.62 
 
What we see here is a shift in the nature and location of borders that relates directly to 
changes in the nature of the state. It is the transnational extension of national interests, in the 
service of the logics of capital, that seems to be driving the deconstruction and reconstruction 
of borders, and with them the inside/outside solution alighted upon by modernity. One thrust 
of the new Critical Border Studies literature is to argue that the dividing line that demarcates 
and constitutes the state system is somehow shifting - unleashing a whole host of new 
speculations on the nature of territoriality and sovereignty, the transformative impact of 
networks and the recasting of centres and peripheries. No longer can we assume that borders 
appear only at the edges of the territorial state container. Rather, new borders and boundaries 
are appearing in unexpected places, winding their way across stretches of global space. Much 
of this spatial deformation has been facilitated by the new network technologies, which have 
the capacity to generate novel inside/outside configurations, such as global city networks.We 
have seen the same logic operating at a different scale: on the very fabric of the global city, 
where gated communities, privatised infrastructural networks and the citedelisation of 
transportation and central business districts recapitulate the practice of drawing new borders 
and boundaries deep within the city, and thus deep within and far away from the older border 
of the national state. The ability of non-state actors to draw borders has become diffused 
throughout society, as a result of the embrace of multi-level governance.63 
 
When order and security become the primary foundations of sovereign legitimacy, and when 
security threats become diffuse and borders mutate, it is perhaps inevitable that in the pursuit 
of these goals states will be drawn to ever more authoritarian postures and militarised 
techniques, as they move secure valued infrastructures. Such developments may easily be 
read as a form of neo-imperial practice. Graham has argued that the network of global cities 
forms part of nothing less than a 'transnational imperial infrastructure', bound up with US 
structural power in the contemporary global order.64 There is a complex relationship at work 
here between contemporary and earlier forms of imperial control, as 'imperialist and colonial 
geographies 'umbilically connect' the metropolitan cores of global city nodes with the 
developing periphery. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article my method has been to take a concrete phenomenon, the increasingly visible 
governance activates of cities at the transnational level, and to progressively uncover the 
drivers that have produced it. These have included the increasing prominence of global 
governance, its role as part of a decentralised neoliberal strategy of leading states to construct 
a global market society, the configuration of power in international society that underpins the 
projection of this strategy, and the history of failure of statist forms of political economy that 
produced the strategy.  
 
I then went on to tease out some of the implications of these developments. We saw how from 
these origins a new relationship between the state and the city has emerged, and how 
traditional conceptions of sovereignty, territoriality and security have been stretched and 
deformed, as the state seeks to secure the transnational networks of value that run through 
global cities. Leading states now draw their lifeblood from the transnational flows passing 
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through global city networks, and rely upon the intricate material infrastructures sustaining 
them. It seems a logical corollary that states will seek to modify their security practices to 
protect these spaces, extending their reach across selected networks of valued transnational 
space. 
 
We must be careful, then, not to misread the developments charted here as some simple shift 
from a form of order based upon the international society of states to a form of order where 
the state no longer plays a central role, as in some of the more naive globalisation theories, or 
in Barber’s hoped for scenario of ‘municipal confederalism’. It is not simple state failure with 
which we are faced, but, instead, the emergence of a complex configuration of global order in 
which states now take their place in a meshwork of governance arrangements that includes 
other sites of authority and influence, perhaps the most important of which is the global city.  
 
